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ABSTRACT	  
Librarians	  have	  a	  professional	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  right	  to	  access	  information	  free	  from	  
surveillance.	  This	  right	  is	  at	  risk	  from	  a	  new	  and	  increasing	  threat:	  the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  non-­‐
personally	  identifying	  information	  such	  as	  IP	  addresses	  through	  online	  behavioral	  tracking.	  This	  
paper	  provides	  an	  overview	  of	  behavioral	  tracking,	  identifying	  the	  risks	  and	  benefits,	  describes	  the	  
mechanisms	  used	  to	  track	  this	  information,	  and	  offers	  strategies	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  and	  limit	  
behavioral	  tracking.	  We	  argue	  that	  this	  knowledge	  is	  critical	  for	  librarians	  in	  two	  interconnected	  
ways.	  First,	  librarians	  should	  be	  evaluating	  recommended	  websites	  with	  respect	  to	  behavioral	  
tracking	  practices	  to	  help	  protect	  patron	  privacy;	  second,	  they	  should	  be	  providing	  digital	  literacy	  
education	  about	  behavioral	  tracking	  to	  empower	  patrons	  to	  protect	  their	  own	  privacy	  online.	  
INTRODUCTION	  Privacy	  is	  important	  to	  librarians.	  The	  American	  Library	  Association	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (2008)	  states	  that	  “we	  protect	  each	  library	  user’s	  right	  to	  privacy	  and	  confidentiality	  with	  respect	  to	  information	  sought	  or	  received	  and	  resources	  consulted,	  borrowed,	  acquired	  or	  transmitted,”	  while	  the	  Canadian	  Library	  Association	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (1976)	  states	  that	  members	  have	  responsibility	  to	  “protect	  the	  privacy	  and	  dignity	  of	  library	  users	  and	  staff.”	  This	  translates	  to	  a	  core	  professional	  commitment:	  according	  to	  the	  American	  Library	  Association	  (2014,	  under	  “Why	  Libraries?”),	  “librarians	  feel	  a	  professional	  responsibility	  to	  protect	  the	  right	  to	  search	  for	  information	  free	  from	  surveillance.”	  Increasingly,	  information	  searches	  are	  conducted	  online,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  librarians	  should	  be	  paying	  specific	  attention	  to	  online	  surveillance	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  satisfy	  their	  privacy-­‐related	  professional	  responsibility.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  current	  environment	  of	  significant	  and	  increasing	  threat	  to	  privacy	  in	  the	  online	  context.	  Although	  many	  concerns	  about	  online	  privacy	  relate	  to	  the	  collection,	  use,	  and	  sharing	  of	  personally	  identifiable	  information,	  there	  is	  increasing	  awareness	  of	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  ‘non-­‐personally	  identifiable	  information’	  (e.g.:	  Internet	  Protocol	  addresses,	  pages	  visited,	  geographic	  location	  information,	  search	  strings,	  etc.;	  Office	  of	  the	  Privacy	  Commissioner	  of	  Canada	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2011,	  12).	  This	  practice	  has	  been	  termed	  ‘behavioral	  tracking’,	  and	  recent	  revelations	  of	  government	  security	  agency	  collection	  of	  user	  metadata	  (Ball	  2013;	  Weston,	  Greenwald	  and	  Gallager	  2014)	  have	  heightened	  awareness	  of	  this	  issue.	  The	  problem,	  however,	  is	  not	  new,	  nor	  is	  the	  practice	  restricted	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  governmental	  agencies.	  Indeed,	  as	  early	  as	  1996	  commercial	  and	  non-­‐commercial	  entities	  were	  practicing	  online	  behavioral	  tracking	  for	  purposes	  of	  website	  and	  interaction	  personalization	  and	  to	  present	  targeted	  advertising	  (“Affinicast	  unveils	  personalization	  tool”	  1996;	  “AdOne	  Classified	  Network	  and	  ClickOver	  announce	  strategic	  alliance”	  1997).	  Since	  these	  initial	  forays	  into	  behavioral	  tracking	  and	  personalization	  of	  online	  content	  the	  practice	  has	  proliferated,	  and	  many	  sites	  now	  use	  a	  variety	  of	  behavioral	  tracking	  tools	  to	  enhance	  user	  experience	  and	  deliver	  targeted	  advertisements	  (see,	  e.g.,	  the	  “What	  they	  know”	  series	  from	  the	  Wall	  Street	  Journal	  2010;	  Gomez,	  Pinnick	  and	  Soltani	  2009;	  Soltani	  et	  al.	  2009).	  There	  can	  be	  no	  question	  that	  behavioral	  tracking	  is	  a	  form	  of	  surveillance	  (Castelluccia	  and	  Narayanan	  2012),	  and	  the	  ubiquity	  of	  this	  practice	  means	  that	  users	  are	  regularly	  subject	  to	  this	  type	  of	  surveillance	  when	  they	  access	  online	  resources.	  In	  order	  to	  satisfy	  a	  professional	  commitment	  to	  support	  information	  access	  free	  from	  surveillance,	  librarians	  must	  therefore	  address	  two	  related	  issues:	  first,	  they	  must	  ensure	  that	  the	  resources	  they	  recommend	  are	  privacy-­‐respecting	  in	  that	  those	  resources	  engage	  in	  little	  if	  any	  online	  surveillance;	  second,	  they	  must	  raise	  the	  digital	  literacy	  of	  their	  patrons	  with	  respect	  to	  online	  privacy,	  increasing	  understanding	  of	  online	  tracking	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  strategies	  that	  patrons	  can	  use	  to	  protect	  their	  privacy	  in	  light	  of	  these	  activities.	  Addressing	  the	  first	  issue	  requires	  that	  librarians	  attend	  to	  surveillance	  practices	  when	  recommending	  online	  information	  resources.	  Privacy	  and	  surveillance	  issues,	  however,	  are	  notably	  absent	  from	  common	  guidelines	  for	  evaluating	  web	  resources	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Kapoun	  1998;	  University	  of	  California,	  Berkley	  2012;	  John	  Hopkins	  University	  2013),	  and	  thus	  librarians	  do	  not	  have	  the	  guidance	  they	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  resources	  they	  recommend	  are	  privacy-­‐respecting.	  It	  is	  critical	  that	  librarians	  and	  other	  information	  professionals	  address	  this	  gap	  by	  developing	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  surveillance	  mechanisms	  used	  by	  websites	  and	  the	  strategies	  that	  can	  be	  deployed	  to	  identify	  and	  even	  nullify	  these	  mechanisms.	  This	  same	  understanding	  is	  necessary	  to	  address	  the	  second	  goal	  of	  raising	  the	  privacy-­‐related	  digital	  literacy	  of	  patrons.	  Librarians	  must	  understand	  tracking	  mechanisms	  and	  potential	  responses	  in	  order	  to	  integrate	  privacy	  literacy	  into	  library	  digital	  literacy	  initiatives	  that	  are	  central	  to	  the	  mission	  of	  libraries	  (American	  Library	  Association	  2013).	  This	  paper	  provides	  an	  introduction	  to	  behavioral	  tracking	  mechanisms	  and	  responses.	  The	  goals	  of	  this	  paper	  are	  to	  provide	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  risks	  and	  benefits	  associated	  with	  online	  behavioral	  tracking,	  to	  discuss	  the	  various	  surveillance	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  used	  to	  track	  user	  behavior,	  and	  to	  provide	  strategies	  for	  identifying	  and	  limiting	  online	  behavioral	  tracking.	  We	  have	  elsewhere	  published	  analyses	  of	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices	  on	  websites	  recommended	  by	  information	  professionals	  (Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2015),	  and	  on	  practices	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  disclosure	  of	  tracking	  mechanisms	  (Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2015).	  This	  paper	  serves	  as	  an	  adjunct	  to	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those	  empirical	  results,	  providing	  information	  professionals	  with	  background	  that	  will	  assist	  them	  in	  negotiating,	  on	  the	  part	  of	  themselves	  and	  their	  patrons,	  the	  complex	  territory	  of	  online	  privacy.	  
Consumer	  attitudes	  toward	  behavioral	  tracking	  Survey	  data	  suggest	  that	  consumers	  are,	  in	  general,	  aware	  of	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices.	  The	  2013	  US	  Consumer	  Data	  Privacy	  Study	  (TRUSTe	  2013),	  for	  example,	  reveals	  that	  80	  percent	  of	  users	  are	  aware	  of	  online	  behavioral	  tracking	  on	  their	  desktop	  devices,	  while	  slightly	  under	  70	  percent	  are	  aware	  of	  tracking	  on	  mobile	  devices	  (see	  also	  Office	  of	  the	  Privacy	  Commissioner	  of	  Canada	  2013).	  Awareness,	  however,	  does	  not	  directly	  translate	  to	  understanding,	  and	  recent	  data	  indicate	  that	  even	  relatively	  sophisticated	  Internet	  users	  are	  not	  fully	  informed	  about	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices	  (McDonald	  and	  Cranor	  2010;	  Smit	  et	  al.	  2014).	  Moreover,	  attitudes	  about	  tracking	  are	  at	  best	  ambivalent	  (Ur	  et	  al.	  2012),	  and	  many	  studies	  indicate	  a	  predominantly	  negative	  reaction	  to	  these	  practices	  (Turow	  et	  al.	  2009;	  McDonald	  and	  Cranor	  2010;	  TRUSTe	  2013).	  Although	  it	  is	  not	  universally	  required	  by	  regulatory	  frameworks,	  many	  users	  feel	  that	  companies	  should	  request	  permission	  before	  collecting	  behavioral	  tracking	  data	  (Office	  of	  the	  Privacy	  Commissioner	  of	  Canada	  2013).	  Finally,	  although	  some	  users	  take	  steps	  to	  limit	  or	  even	  eliminate	  behavioral	  tracking,	  many	  do	  not.	  For	  example,	  while	  one-­‐third	  to	  three-­‐quarters	  of	  survey	  respondents	  indicate	  that	  they	  manage	  or	  refuse	  browser	  cookies	  (TRUSTe	  2013;	  comScore	  2007;	  2011;	  Rainie	  et	  al.	  2013),	  at	  least	  one	  quarter	  reported	  no	  attempts	  to	  limit	  behavioral	  tracking.	  This	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  difficulty	  in	  using	  such	  mechanisms	  (Leon	  et	  al.	  2011).	  
Behavioral	  tracking	  and	  its	  mechanisms	  Tracking	  mechanisms	  transmit	  non-­‐personally	  identifiable	  information	  to	  websites	  for	  different	  purposes.	  Originally,	  the	  information	  collected	  by	  these	  mechanisms	  was	  used	  to	  enhance	  user	  experience	  and	  to	  make	  these	  website	  interactions	  more	  efficient.	  Tracking	  mechanisms	  can	  record	  user	  actions	  on	  a	  web	  page	  and	  their	  interaction	  preferences.	  Using	  these	  data,	  websites	  can	  for	  example	  direct	  returning	  visitors	  to	  a	  specific	  location	  in	  the	  site,	  allowing	  those	  visitors	  to	  resume	  interaction	  with	  a	  website	  at	  the	  point	  where	  they	  were	  on	  the	  previous	  visit.	  Using	  the	  Internet	  Protocol	  (IP)	  address	  of	  a	  user,	  websites	  can	  display	  information	  relevant	  to	  the	  geographic	  area	  where	  a	  user	  is	  located.	  Tracking	  mechanisms	  also	  allow	  a	  website	  to	  remember	  registration	  details	  and	  the	  items	  users	  have	  put	  in	  their	  shopping	  basket	  (Harding,	  Reed	  and	  Gray	  2007).	  Tracking	  mechanisms	  are	  also	  of	  great	  use	  to	  webmasters,	  supporting	  the	  optimization	  of	  website	  design.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  these	  mechanisms	  can	  inform	  webmasters	  of	  users’	  movements	  on	  their	  websites:	  what	  pages	  are	  visited,	  how	  often	  they	  are	  visited,	  and	  in	  what	  order.	  They	  can	  also	  indicate	  the	  common	  entry	  and	  exit	  points	  for	  a	  specific	  website.	  This	  information	  can	  be	  leveraged	  in	  site	  redesign	  to	  increase	  user	  satisfaction	  and	  traffic.	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Website	  optimization	  and	  interaction	  personalization	  have	  potential	  benefit	  to	  users.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  detailed	  profile	  of	  user	  activities,	  potentially	  aggregated	  across	  multiple	  visits	  to	  different	  websites,	  presents	  potential	  privacy	  risks.	  The	  information	  gathered	  through	  tracking	  mechanisms	  can	  allow	  a	  website	  to	  identify	  browsing	  and	  information	  access	  habits,	  to	  infer	  user	  characteristics	  including	  location	  and	  some	  demographics,	  and	  to	  know	  what	  topics	  or	  products	  are	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  a	  user.	  Tracking	  mechanisms	  can	  be	  first-­‐party	  or	  third-­‐party,	  and	  the	  difference	  has	  implications	  for	  the	  detail	  that	  can	  be	  assembled	  in	  the	  user	  profile.	  First-­‐party	  mechanisms	  are	  set	  by	  directly	  by	  the	  website	  a	  user	  is	  visiting,	  while	  third-­‐party	  mechanisms	  are	  set	  by	  outside	  companies	  providing	  services,	  such	  as	  advertising,	  analysis	  of	  user	  patterns	  and	  social	  media	  integration,	  on	  the	  primary	  site.	  First-­‐party	  tracking	  mechanisms	  collect	  information	  about	  a	  site	  visit	  and	  visitor	  and	  deliver	  that	  information	  to	  the	  site	  itself.	  Using	  first-­‐party	  tracking,	  web	  sites	  can	  provide	  personalized	  interaction,	  integrating	  visit	  and	  visitor	  information	  both	  within	  a	  single	  visit	  and	  across	  multiple	  visits	  (Randall	  1997).	  This	  information	  is	  available	  only	  to	  the	  web	  site	  itself,	  and	  thus	  neither	  includes	  information	  about	  visits	  to	  other	  sites	  nor	  is	  accessible	  by	  other	  websites,	  unless	  the	  information	  is	  sold	  or	  leaked	  by	  the	  first-­‐party	  site	  (see	  Narayanan	  2011).	  Third-­‐party	  tracking	  mechanisms,	  by	  contrast,	  deliver	  information	  about	  a	  site	  visit	  and	  visitor	  to	  a	  third	  party.	  This	  transaction	  is	  often	  invisible	  to	  the	  user,	  and	  the	  information	  is	  transmitted	  typically	  without	  explicit	  user	  consent.	  Third-­‐party	  tracking	  represents	  a	  greater	  menace	  to	  privacy,	  since	  third	  parties	  have	  a	  presence	  on	  multiple	  sites,	  and	  are	  able	  to	  collect	  information	  about	  users	  and	  their	  activities	  on	  all	  those	  sites	  and	  integrate	  that	  information	  across	  sites	  and	  across	  visits	  into	  a	  single	  detailed	  user	  profile	  (see	  Mayer	  and	  Mitchell	  2012	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  privacy	  problems	  associated	  with	  third-­‐party	  tracking).	  Research	  demonstrates	  that	  third-­‐party	  tracking	  is	  a	  common	  and	  perhaps	  even	  ubiquitous	  practice	  (Gomez,	  Pinnick	  and	  Soltani	  2009;	  (Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2013).	  It	  is	  not	  uncommon	  for	  websites	  to	  have	  trackers	  from	  more	  than	  one	  third	  party,	  and	  some	  websites,	  especially	  popular	  ones,	  have	  trackers	  from	  dozens	  of	  different	  organizations:	  Gomez,	  Pinnick	  and	  Soltani	  (2009),	  for	  example,	  found	  100	  unique	  web	  beacons	  on	  a	  single	  website.	  Furthermore,	  the	  same	  tracking	  companies	  are	  present	  on	  many	  different	  websites,	  allowing	  them	  to	  integrate	  into	  a	  single	  profile	  information	  about	  visits	  to	  each	  of	  these	  many	  sites.	  PrivacyChoice1,	  which	  maintains	  a	  comprehensive	  database	  of	  tracking	  companies,	  estimates	  that	  Google	  Display	  Network	  (Doubleclick),	  for	  instance,	  has	  a	  presence	  on	  57	  percent	  of	  websites.	  Thus,	  a	  user	  traveling	  the	  web	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  tracked	  by	  Doubleclick	  on	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  sites	  they	  visit,	  and	  Doubleclick	  has	  access	  to	  information	  about	  all	  visits	  to	  each	  of	  these	  many	  sites.	  Worries	  about	  the	  potential	  privacy	  breaches	  that	  mechanisms	  for	  tracking	  a	  user’s	  activities	  online	  can	  allow	  are	  not	  new.	  Even	  at	  their	  inception	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  HTTP	  cookies	  (also	  known	  as	  browser	  cookies)	  were	  generating	  controversy	  about	  the	  potential	  invasion	  of	  privacy	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(e.g.	  Randall	  1997).	  Users,	  however,	  quickly	  realized	  that	  they	  could	  manage	  HTTP	  cookies	  using	  accessible	  browser	  settings	  that	  limit	  or	  even	  entirely	  disallow	  the	  practice	  of	  setting	  cookies.	  As	  a	  result,	  websites,	  advertisers	  and	  others	  who	  benefit	  from	  web	  audience	  segmentation	  and	  behavior	  analytics	  developed	  newer	  and	  more	  obscure	  tracking	  technologies	  including	  ‘supercookies’	  and	  web	  beacons,	  and	  these	  technologies	  are	  now	  deployed	  along	  with	  HTTP	  cookies	  (Sipior,	  Ward	  and	  Mendoza	  2011).	  Tracking	  technologies	  are	  constantly	  evolving	  in	  response	  to	  user	  behavior	  and	  advertiser	  demand,	  therefore	  keeping	  up	  to	  date	  is	  an	  ongoing	  challenge	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Goodwin	  2011).	  
HTTP	  cookies	  HTTP	  cookies	  were	  originally	  meant	  to	  help	  web	  developers	  “invisibly”	  gather	  information	  about	  users	  in	  order	  to	  personalize	  and	  optimize	  user	  experience	  (Randall	  1997).	  These	  cookies	  are	  simply	  a	  few	  lines	  of	  text	  shared	  in	  an	  HTTP	  transaction,	  and	  a	  typical	  cookie	  might	  include	  a	  user	  ID,	  the	  time	  of	  a	  visit,	  and	  the	  IP	  address	  of	  the	  computer.	  Cookies	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  specific	  browser,	  and	  the	  information	  is	  not	  shared	  between	  different	  browsers	  on	  the	  same	  machine:	  thus,	  the	  cookies	  stored	  by	  Firefox	  are	  not	  accessible	  to	  Internet	  Explorer,	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Cookies	  do	  not	  usually	  include	  identifying	  information	  such	  as	  name	  or	  address,	  and	  they	  are	  able	  to	  do	  so	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  user	  has	  explicitly	  provided	  this	  information	  to	  the	  website.	  When	  users	  want	  to	  access	  a	  web	  page,	  their	  browser	  sends	  a	  request	  to	  the	  server	  for	  the	  specific	  website	  and	  the	  server	  searches	  the	  hard	  drive	  for	  a	  cookie	  file	  from	  this	  site.	  If	  there	  is	  no	  cookie,	  a	  unique	  identifier	  code	  is	  assigned	  to	  the	  browser	  and	  a	  cookie	  file	  is	  saved	  on	  the	  hard	  drive.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  cookie,	  it	  is	  retrieved	  and	  the	  information	  is	  used	  to	  personalize	  and	  structure	  the	  website	  interaction	  (for	  a	  detailed	  description	  of	  the	  mechanics	  of	  cookies,	  see	  Kriscol	  2001,	  152–155).	  	  Some	  HTTP	  cookies,	  called	  session	  or	  transient	  cookies,	  automatically	  expire	  when	  the	  browser	  is	  closed	  (Barth	  2011).	  They	  are	  mainly	  used	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  what	  a	  consumer	  has	  added	  to	  a	  shopping	  cart	  or	  to	  allow	  users	  to	  navigate	  on	  a	  website	  without	  having	  to	  log	  in	  repeatedly.	  Other	  HTTP	  cookies,	  called	  permanent,	  persistent	  or	  stored	  cookies,	  are	  configured	  to	  keep	  track	  of	  users	  until	  the	  cookie	  reaches	  its	  expiration	  date,	  which	  can	  be	  set	  many	  years	  after	  creation	  (Barth	  2011).	  Permanent	  HTTP	  cookies	  can	  be	  easily	  deleted	  using	  browser	  management	  tools	  (Sipior,	  Ward	  and	  Mendoza	  2011).	  Studies	  have	  shown	  that	  approximately	  a	  third	  of	  users	  delete	  cookies	  once	  a	  month	  (e.g.	  comScore	  2007;	  2011).	  Such	  behavior,	  however,	  displeases	  advertisers,	  as	  it	  leads	  to	  an	  overestimation	  of	  the	  number	  of	  true	  unique	  visitors	  on	  a	  website	  and	  impede	  user	  tracking	  (Marshall	  2005;	  see	  also	  comScore	  2007;	  2011).	  
Flash	  cookies	  and	  other	  ‘supercookies’	  To	  palliate	  this	  ‘attack’	  on	  HTTP	  cookies,	  an	  online	  advertising	  company,	  United	  Virtualities,	  developed	  a	  backup	  system	  for	  cookies	  using	  the	  local	  shared	  object	  feature	  of	  Adobe’s	  Flash	  Player	  plug-­‐in:	  the	  persistent	  identification	  element	  (Sipior,	  Ward	  and	  Mendoza	  2011).	  This	  type	  of	  storage,	  called	  Flash	  Player	  Local	  Shared	  Objects	  or,	  more	  commonly,	  Flash	  cookies,	  shares	  many	  similarities	  with	  HTTP	  cookies	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  tracking	  capabilities,	  storing	  similar	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non-­‐personally	  identifying	  information.	  Unlike	  HTTP	  cookies,	  however,	  Flash	  cookies	  do	  not	  have	  an	  expiration	  date,	  a	  characteristic	  that	  makes	  them	  permanent	  until	  they	  are	  manually	  deleted.	  They	  are	  also	  not	  handled	  by	  a	  browser,	  but	  are	  stored	  in	  a	  location	  accessible	  to	  different	  browsers	  and	  Flash	  widgets,	  which	  are	  thus	  all	  able	  to	  access	  the	  same	  cookie.	  They	  can	  hold	  much	  more	  data	  (up	  to	  100	  KB	  by	  default	  compared	  to	  4	  KB	  for	  HTTP	  cookies),	  and	  support	  more	  complex	  data	  types	  than	  HTTP	  cookies	  (see	  MacDonald	  and	  Cranor	  2012	  for	  a	  technical	  comparison	  of	  HTTP	  and	  Flash	  cookies).	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  estimated	  that	  Adobe’s	  Flash	  Player	  is	  installed	  on	  over	  99	  percent	  of	  personal	  computers	  (Adobe	  2011),	  making	  Flash	  cookies	  usable	  on	  virtually	  all	  computers.	  Flash	  cookies	  represent	  a	  more	  resilient	  technology	  for	  tracking	  than	  HTTP	  cookies.	  Erasing	  traditional	  cookies	  within	  a	  browser	  does	  not	  affect	  Flash	  cookies,	  which	  needs	  to	  be	  erased	  in	  a	  separate	  panel	  (Sipior,	  Ward	  and	  Mendoza	  2011).	  Flash	  cookies	  also	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  ‘respawn’	  (or	  recreate)	  deleted	  HTTP	  cookies.	  A	  website	  using	  Flash	  cookies	  can	  therefore	  track	  users	  across	  sessions	  even	  if	  the	  user	  has	  taken	  reasonable	  steps	  to	  avoid	  this	  type	  of	  online	  profiling	  (Soltani	  et	  al.	  2009),	  and	  although	  it	  is	  declining	  in	  incidence,	  this	  practice	  is	  still	  occurring,	  sometimes	  on	  very	  popular	  websites	  (Ayenson	  et	  al.	  2011;	  MacDonald	  and	  Cranor	  2012).	  	  It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  other	  Internet	  technologies	  (e.g.	  Silverlight,	  JavaScript,	  and	  HTML5),	  which	  have	  so	  far	  attracted	  less	  attention	  from	  researchers,	  use	  local	  storage	  for	  similar	  purposes.	  One	  developer	  even	  created	  the	  ‘evercookie’,	  a	  very	  persistent	  cookie	  incorporating	  twelve	  types	  of	  storage	  mechanisms	  available	  in	  a	  browser	  that	  makes	  data	  persist	  and	  allows	  for	  respawning	  (Kamkar	  2010),	  a	  method	  investigated	  by	  the	  National	  Security	  Agency	  to	  de-­‐anonymize	  users	  of	  the	  Tor	  network,	  (‘Tor	  Stinks’	  presentation	  2013),	  a	  network	  which	  aims	  at	  concealing	  the	  location	  and	  usage	  of	  users.	  
Web	  beacons	  Users’	  online	  behavior	  can	  also	  be	  monitored	  by	  web	  beacons	  (also	  called	  web	  bugs,	  clear	  GIFs	  or	  pixel	  tags),	  which	  tiny	  are	  image	  tags	  embedded	  within	  a	  document,	  appearing	  on	  a	  webpage	  or	  attached	  to	  an	  email,	  that	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  unnoticed	  (Martin,	  Wu	  and	  Alsaid	  2003).	  The	  image	  tag	  creates	  a	  holding	  space	  for	  a	  referenced	  image	  residing	  on	  the	  Web,	  and	  beacons	  transmit	  information	  to	  a	  remote	  computer	  when	  the	  document	  (web	  page	  or	  email)	  is	  viewed.	  Web	  beacons	  can	  gather	  information	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  they	  can	  also	  retrieve	  information	  from	  a	  previously	  set	  cookie	  (Angwin	  2010;	  see	  Martin,	  Wu	  and	  Alsaid	  2003	  for	  description	  of	  the	  different	  technological	  abilities	  of	  web	  beacons).	  Such	  capacity	  means,	  according	  to	  the	  Privacy	  Foundation	  (Smith	  2000;	  quoted	  in	  Martin,	  Wu	  and	  Alsaid	  2003),	  that	  beacons	  could	  potentially	  transfer	  to	  a	  third	  party	  demographic	  data	  and	  personally	  identifiable	  information	  (name,	  address,	  phone	  number,	  email	  address,	  etc.)	  that	  a	  user	  has	  typed	  on	  a	  page.	  Unlike	  cookies,	  beacons	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  a	  specific	  server	  and	  can	  track	  users	  over	  multiple	  web	  sites	  (Schoen	  2009).	  Beacons,	  moreover,	  cannot	  be	  managed	  through	  browser	  settings.	  While	  blocking	  third-­‐party	  cookies	  limit	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their	  range	  of	  action,	  it	  does	  not	  preclude	  beacons	  from	  gathering	  information	  on	  their	  own,	  and	  users	  have	  to	  install	  extensions	  to	  their	  browser	  to	  efficiently	  limit	  the	  effects	  of	  web	  beacons.	  
Strategies	  for	  identifying	  behavioral	  tracking	  In	  order	  to	  identify	  privacy-­‐respecting	  online	  resources,	  librarians	  must	  learn	  to	  assess	  the	  behavioral	  tracking	  activities	  occurring	  on	  websites.	  The	  first	  step	  is	  to	  identify	  and	  review	  website	  privacy	  policies.	  Privacy	  guidelines	  regulating	  the	  collection,	  retention	  and	  use	  of	  personal	  information	  in	  the	  online	  environment	  usually	  require	  that	  users	  should	  be	  given	  notice	  of	  website	  practices	  (e.g.,	  Fair	  Information	  Practice	  Principles2	  proposed	  in	  1973	  by	  the	  US	  Secretary’s	  Advisory	  Committee	  on	  Automated	  Personal	  Data	  Systems,	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  
Individuals	  with	  Regard	  to	  Automatic	  Processing	  of	  Personal	  Data	  developed	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  (1981),	  and	  the	  Organisation	  for	  Economic	  Co-­‐operation	  and	  Development	  Guidelines	  on	  
the	  Protection	  of	  Privacy	  and	  Transborder	  flows	  of	  Personal	  Data3).	  This	  notice	  is	  typically	  provided	  in	  privacy	  policies	  that	  identify	  what	  information	  is	  collected,	  how	  it	  is	  used,	  and	  with	  whom	  it	  is	  shared.	  Regulatory	  frameworks,	  however,	  did	  not	  originally	  contemplate	  the	  collection	  of	  non-­‐personally	  identifiable	  information.	  While	  such	  disclosure	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  Fair	  Information	  Practice	  Principles,	  the	  current	  mode	  of	  mode	  of	  control	  is	  in	  many	  cases	  self-­‐regulatory45,	  and	  full	  compliance	  with	  notice	  requirements	  is	  far	  from	  universal	  (Komanduri	  et	  al.	  2011-­‐2012).	  Thus,	  while	  disclosure	  of	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices	  in	  websites	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  diagnostic	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  these	  mechanisms,	  lack	  of	  disclosure	  cannot	  be	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  that	  the	  site	  does	  not	  engage	  in	  behavioral	  tracking	  (Komanduri	  et	  al.	  2011-­‐2012;	  Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2013b).	  Furthermore,	  privacy	  policy	  disclosures,	  where	  they	  do	  exist,	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  understand	  (Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2013b).	  Website	  privacy	  policies	  are	  often	  complex	  (Micheti,	  Burkell	  and	  Steeves	  2010).	  They	  tend	  to	  be	  written	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  protecting	  a	  website	  owner	  against	  lawsuits	  rather	  than	  informing	  users	  (Earp	  et	  al.	  2005;	  Pollach	  2005).	  Pollach	  (2005),	  for	  example,	  details	  a	  variety	  of	  linguistic	  strategies	  that	  serve	  to	  undermine	  user	  understanding	  of	  website	  practices,	  including	  mitigation	  and	  enhancement,	  obfuscation	  of	  reality,	  relationship	  building,	  and	  persuasive	  appeals.	  Therefore,	  even	  if	  many	  websites	  acknowledge	  the	  collection	  of	  non-­‐personally	  identifiable	  information,	  both	  from	  first-­‐	  and	  third-­‐party,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  this	  disclosure	  is	  limited,	  making	  privacy	  policies	  a	  relatively	  ineffective	  tool	  to	  identify	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
3 C(80)58/FINAL, as amended on 11 July 2013 by C(2013)79. 
4 For instance, the new Self-Regulatory Guidelines for Online Behavioral Advertising identify the need to provide notice to 
users when behavioral data is collected that allows the tracking of users across websites and over time (United States Federal 
Trade Commission, 2009). 
5 Exceptions to this self-regulatory principle are increasing, including but not limited to the California Online Privacy 
Protection Act of 2003 (OPPA), and the EU Cookie Directive (2009/136/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
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As	  a	  result,	  librarians	  need	  to	  develop	  strategies	  and	  tools	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  assess	  directly	  the	  behavioral	  tracking	  practices	  of	  websites,	  in	  order	  that	  these	  practices	  can	  be	  considered	  in	  making	  websites	  recommendations.	  Different	  protocols	  can	  be	  followed	  in	  making	  this	  assessment,	  but	  they	  should	  be	  built	  around	  the	  following	  guiding	  principles	  (see	  Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2013a	  for	  a	  full	  discussion).	  The	  first	  important	  principle	  is	  that	  each	  website	  should	  be	  visited	  in	  an	  independent	  session	  to	  eliminate	  contamination.	  Each	  website	  under	  consideration	  should	  be	  visited	  in	  an	  independent	  session,	  beginning	  with	  the	  browser	  at	  an	  about:blank	  page,	  with	  clean	  data	  directories	  (no	  HTTP	  and	  Flash	  cookies,	  and	  an	  empty	  cache).	  The	  evaluator	  should	  ensure	  that	  browser	  settings	  are	  configured	  to	  allow	  cookies,	  tools	  to	  track	  web	  beacons	  (e.g.,	  the	  Ghostery6	  browser	  extension)	  are	  installed	  in	  the	  browser,	  and	  Adobe	  Flash,	  via	  the	  Website	  Storage	  Settings	  panel	  is	  configured	  to	  accept	  data.	  The	  website	  should	  then	  be	  accessed	  directly	  by	  entering	  the	  domain	  name	  into	  the	  browser’s	  navigation	  bar.	  Evaluators	  should	  mimic	  a	  typical	  user	  interaction	  with	  the	  website	  on	  many	  pages	  without	  clicking	  on	  advertisements	  or	  following	  links	  to	  outside	  sites.	  As	  they	  browse	  through	  the	  site,	  the	  evaluator	  should	  record	  the	  web	  beacons	  and	  trackers	  identified	  by	  the	  browser	  extension	  (e.g.,	  Ghostery).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  session,	  they	  should	  immediately	  review	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  browser	  cookie	  file	  and	  the	  Adobe	  Flash	  Panel	  via	  Website	  Storage	  settings,	  recording	  any	  cookies	  that	  are	  present.	  PrivacyChoice,	  as	  well	  as	  Ghostery,	  maintains	  a	  database	  of	  trackers	  that	  evaluators	  can	  use	  to	  identify	  associated	  privacy	  risk.	  While	  all	  third-­‐party	  trackers	  raise	  some	  privacy	  issues,	  some	  of	  them	  put	  users	  at	  a	  greater	  risk	  than	  others,	  either	  because	  of	  their	  practices	  or	  their	  presence	  on	  a	  large	  number	  of	  websites.	  Evaluators	  should	  take	  that	  into	  account	  when	  making	  a	  decision.	  
Strategies	  for	  limiting	  behavioral	  tracking	  Users	  may	  also	  take	  these	  steps	  to	  identify	  the	  presence	  of	  behavioral	  tracking,	  and	  digital	  literacy	  initiatives	  should	  provide	  this	  information	  along	  with	  tools	  and	  strategies	  that	  users	  can	  employ	  to	  limit	  tracking.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  elimination	  of	  all	  behavioral	  tracking	  may	  not	  be	  a	  desirable	  outcome	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  users	  who	  benefit	  from	  the	  website	  personalization	  and	  optimization	  supported	  by	  these	  mechanisms.	  Targeted	  advertising	  can	  also	  be	  positive	  for	  many	  people,	  since	  it	  eliminates	  unwanted	  or	  ‘useless’	  advertisements.	  Ultimately,	  a	  user	  must	  decide	  whether	  he	  or	  she	  wants	  to	  be	  tracked.	  Digital	  literacy	  initiatives	  should	  raise	  awareness	  of	  behavioral	  tracking	  and	  provide	  users	  with	  the	  tools	  they	  need	  to	  identify	  and	  control	  tracking	  should	  they	  choose	  to	  do	  so.	  	  The	  easiest	  step	  is	  for	  users	  to	  learn	  how	  to	  manage	  HTTP	  cookies	  in	  every	  web	  browser	  that	  they	  use.	  Using	  browser	  settings,	  users	  can	  decide	  to	  refuse	  third-­‐party	  cookies	  or	  even	  all	  cookies.	  The	  latter,	  however,	  will	  make	  the	  make	  the	  browsing	  experience	  much	  less	  efficient	  and	  may	  impede	  users	  from	  accessing	  some	  websites.	  Users	  should	  also	  learn	  how	  to	  delete	  cookies	  and	  they	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  think	  about	  periodically	  emptying	  the	  cookie	  file	  of	  each	  of	  their	  browsers.	  Controlling	  Flash	  cookies	  is	  more	  complex,	  yet	  crucial	  considering	  the	  capabilities	  of	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Flash	  cookies.	  This	  is	  achieved	  through	  settings	  on	  the	  Adobe	  Website	  Storage	  Settings	  Panel.	  Browser	  extensions,	  such	  as	  Ghostery	  and	  AdBlock	  Plus7,	  can	  be	  added	  to	  most	  browsers.	  Ghostery	  allows	  users	  to	  block	  trackers,	  either	  on	  a	  tracker-­‐by-­‐tracker	  basis,	  a	  site-­‐by-­‐site	  basis	  or	  a	  mixture	  of	  the	  two.	  Also	  customable,	  Adblock	  Plus	  allows	  users	  to	  block	  either	  all	  advertisements	  or	  only	  the	  ones	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  see.	  These	  extensions,	  however,	  may	  slow	  down	  Internet	  browsing.	  Users	  can	  also	  change	  their	  Internet	  use	  habits.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  user	  to	  use	  search	  engines	  that	  do	  dot	  store	  any	  non-­‐personally	  identifiable	  information,	  such	  as	  Ixquick8	  and	  DuckDuckGo9.	  Ixquick	  returns	  the	  top	  ten	  results	  from	  multiple	  search	  engines.	  It	  only	  sets	  one	  cookie	  that	  remembers	  a	  user’s	  search	  preferences	  and	  that	  is	  deleted	  after	  a	  user	  does	  not	  visit	  Ixquick	  for	  90	  days.	  DuckDuckGo,	  which	  returns	  the	  same	  search	  results	  for	  a	  given	  search	  term	  to	  all	  users,	  aims	  at	  getting	  information	  from	  the	  best	  sources	  rather	  than	  the	  most	  sources.	  While	  these	  search	  engines	  do	  not	  have	  all	  the	  functionality	  of	  the	  major	  search	  engines,	  both	  of	  them	  have	  received	  praise	  (e.g.	  McCracken	  2011).	  The	  ultimate	  solution,	  one	  that	  allows	  a	  user	  to	  navigate	  online	  total	  anonymity,	  is	  to	  use	  the	  Tor10	  web	  browser,	  which	  impedes	  network	  surveillance	  or	  traffic	  analysis	  and	  which	  the	  U.S.	  National	  Security	  Agency	  has	  characterized	  as	  “the	  King	  of	  high	  secure,	  low	  latency	  Internet	  anonymity”	  (Schneier	  2013).	  The	  anonymity	  afforded	  by	  Tor,	  however,	  comes	  at	  the	  price	  of	  reduced	  speed	  and	  limitations	  to	  available	  content.	  
CONCLUSION	  It	  is	  widely	  understood	  that	  online	  privacy	  is	  at	  risk,	  threatened	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  governmental	  agencies	  and	  commercial	  entities.	  There	  is	  widespread	  awareness	  of	  and	  attention	  to	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  personally	  identifiable	  information,	  but	  less	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  an	  equally	  significant	  issue:	  the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  information	  that	  is	  highly	  personal	  but	  nonetheless	  ‘non-­‐identifying’.	  This	  practice,	  termed	  ‘behavioral	  tracking’,	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  paper.	  Other	  research	  demonstrates	  that	  behavioral	  tracking	  is	  widespread	  (Gomez,	  Pinnick	  and	  Soltani	  2009;	  Burkell	  and	  Fortier	  2013a),	  but	  users	  demonstrate	  only	  a	  limited	  knowledge	  of	  the	  practice	  and	  they	  do	  little	  to	  control	  tracking	  (comScore	  2007;	  2011;	  Rainie	  et	  al.	  2013;	  TRUSTe	  2013).	  We	  argue	  that	  librarians	  have	  a	  dual	  professional	  responsibility	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  issue:	  first,	  librarians	  should	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  surveillance	  practices	  of	  the	  websites	  they	  recommend	  to	  patrons	  and	  take	  these	  practices	  into	  account	  in	  making	  website	  recommendations;	  second,	  digital	  literacy	  initiatives	  spearheaded	  by	  librarians	  include	  a	  focus	  on	  online	  privacy,	  and	  provide	  patrons	  with	  the	  information	  they	  need	  to	  manage	  their	  own	  online	  privacy.	  	  This	  paper	  presents	  an	  overview	  of	  online	  behavioral	  tracking	  mechanisms,	  and	  provides	  strategies	  for	  identifying	  and	  limiting	  online	  behavioral	  tracking.	  The	  information	  presented	  provides	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  tracking	  mechanisms	  along	  with	  practical	  strategies	  that	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librarians	  can	  use	  to	  evaluate	  websites	  with	  respect	  to	  these	  practices	  and	  strategies	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  limit	  online	  tracking.	  We	  recommend	  that	  website	  evaluation	  standards	  be	  extended	  to	  include	  assessment	  of	  online	  privacy	  and	  especially	  behavioral	  tracking.	  We	  also	  recommend	  that	  librarians	  actively	  promote	  digital	  literacy	  by	  engaging	  in	  public	  education	  programs	  that	  take	  privacy	  and	  other	  digital	  literacy	  issues	  into	  account	  (American	  Library	  Association	  2013).	  Finally,	  we	  note	  that	  protecting	  online	  privacy	  is	  an	  ongoing	  challenge,	  and	  librarians	  must	  ensure	  that	  they	  continually	  update	  their	  understanding	  of	  online	  surveillance	  mechanisms	  and	  the	  approaches	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  monitor	  and	  limit	  these	  activities.	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